In the history of security controllers over the past 30 years, numerous security features have been developed and tested - but many of them have also been cracked. Related concepts and designs can only have a very short safety life if they are not derived from a comprehensive security philosophy. For customers, choosing the right chip mainly means investigating the corresponding security concepts that originate from a particular security philosophy before deciding to adopt a product for a specific application.
The attacker and the target data <br> <br> control chip is also often seen as an important goal of the attackers, for example, changing the amount of the deposit debit card or change your personal information in identity cards, forged passports.
In a typical application, there are two main reasons for the use of a security controller: First, secrets such as personal keys, data, and credentials must be stored in such a way as to be protected from unauthorized access. In addition, optically secure storage is not enough to effectively protect secrets. Therefore, the birth of the safety controller aims to provide a way to handle this information safely.
On the other hand, attackers try to intercept valuable information in the chip. If the information is separated, the attacker can use the intercepted data to generate a "simulator" for illegal access, identification, or payment. In addition, manipulating the data in the chip is often regarded as an important target of the attacker, for example, changing the amount of the debit card or changing the personal information in the ID card to forge a passport or an access card.
Attacks and equipment range from amateur to professional levels. In the real world, there are even hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to attack security controllers. Therefore, safety controllers should be constantly updated in terms of safety philosophy, concept strategy and countermeasures to effectively respond to modern attacks.
<br> <br> physical attack protection according to their relevance, the signal running on a silicon chip is the target of great interest to the attacker. In the early stages of this safe controller project in the 1980s, attackers have begun to use fine needles to detect and apply signals to the chip. Over the years, the methods of attack have been intensified and microsurgery of the chip can now be detected and signaled via the FIB workstation. For amateur detection/apply attacks, AFM (atomic force microscope) probes or nanoneedles made of tungsten-controlled electrochemical chemical etching are used.
If the most valuable signal - CPU content - is not encrypted, then the main focus should be on protecting the plaintext. The approach adopted in the past was to use synthesis logic or to hide safety-related signals in other non-critical signal lines. All the approaches adopted in history have their advantages and disadvantages, which must be balanced for each chip family and application. Custom designed blocks or chips can be more easily identified than synthetic logic, although the latter is the object of automatic reverse engineering tools.
In the past two decades, the so-called "shielding" method has played an important role in protecting key signals. The easiest way is to use more metal layers to design the chip. The goal is to prevent attackers using amateur devices from stealing signals from chips that contain key clear-text data. In the 1990s, active shielding measures that covered the entire surface of the chip began to spread, preventing illegal access and physical attacks. The re-wiring of chip signals, including shielded wires, was also considered at the time, but at that time the move was considered overly complex.
Today's modern computerized devices and the ease of access are recognized as a big threat to many commercial products. Many products that use plain-text CPU and/or security-optimized cabling still use the shield method - still using active shielding. The advanced protection measure is to use encryption technology in the CPU, using dynamic encryption signals instead of plaintext.
Range attack protection <br> <br> bypass bypass attack a wide range. As early as before the safety controller was developed, there have been electrified bypass attacks on communication devices. In the 1960s, the original technology for encrypted telegraphic equipment was later introduced into the field of security controllers and smart cards. Nowadays, a large number of bypass attacks, from power analysis (SPA, DPA, PEA, template attack) and electromagnetic analysis (EMA, DEMA) to optical radiation analysis, have emerged and can be combined with other attack modes to achieve the best result.
The first way to deal with a bypass attack is to apply noise to the chip output signal, such as by using a noise generator. In addition, it counters against chip behavior, such as using dual-rail logic to minimize bypass signal generation. Today, the common method is to combine hard cryptographic coprocessors and certified cryptographic libraries. One of the newest ways is to use the internal encryption signal in the encryption coprocessor.
Today, the common method is to combine hard cryptographic coprocessors and certified cryptographic libraries. One of the newest ways is to use the internal encryption signal in the encryption coprocessor.
The attacker and the target data <br> <br> control chip is also often seen as an important goal of the attackers, for example, changing the amount of the deposit debit card or change your personal information in identity cards, forged passports.
In a typical application, there are two main reasons for the use of a security controller: First, secrets such as personal keys, data, and credentials must be stored in such a way as to be protected from unauthorized access. In addition, optically secure storage is not enough to effectively protect secrets. Therefore, the birth of the safety controller aims to provide a way to handle this information safely.
On the other hand, attackers try to intercept valuable information in the chip. If the information is separated, the attacker can use the intercepted data to generate a "simulator" for illegal access, identification, or payment. In addition, manipulating the data in the chip is often regarded as an important target of the attacker, for example, changing the amount of the debit card or changing the personal information in the ID card to forge a passport or an access card.
Attacks and equipment range from amateur to professional levels. In the real world, there are even hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to attack security controllers. Therefore, safety controllers should be constantly updated in terms of safety philosophy, concept strategy and countermeasures to effectively respond to modern attacks.
<br> <br> physical attack protection according to their relevance, the signal running on a silicon chip is the target of great interest to the attacker. In the early stages of this safe controller project in the 1980s, attackers have begun to use fine needles to detect and apply signals to the chip. Over the years, the methods of attack have been intensified and microsurgery of the chip can now be detected and signaled via the FIB workstation. For amateur detection/apply attacks, AFM (atomic force microscope) probes or nanoneedles made of tungsten-controlled electrochemical chemical etching are used.
If the most valuable signal - CPU content - is not encrypted, then the main focus should be on protecting the plaintext. The approach adopted in the past was to use synthesis logic or to hide safety-related signals in other non-critical signal lines. All the approaches adopted in history have their advantages and disadvantages, which must be balanced for each chip family and application. Custom designed blocks or chips can be more easily identified than synthetic logic, although the latter is the object of automatic reverse engineering tools.
In the past two decades, the so-called "shielding" method has played an important role in protecting key signals. The easiest way is to use more metal layers to design the chip. The goal is to prevent attackers using amateur devices from stealing signals from chips that contain key clear-text data. In the 1990s, active shielding measures that covered the entire surface of the chip began to spread, preventing illegal access and physical attacks. The re-wiring of chip signals, including shielded wires, was also considered at the time, but at that time the move was considered overly complex.
Today's modern computerized devices and the ease of access are recognized as a big threat to many commercial products. Many products that use plain-text CPU and/or security-optimized cabling still use the shield method - still using active shielding. The advanced protection measure is to use encryption technology in the CPU, using dynamic encryption signals instead of plaintext.
Range attack protection <br> <br> bypass bypass attack a wide range. As early as before the safety controller was developed, there have been electrified bypass attacks on communication devices. In the 1960s, the original technology for encrypted telegraphic equipment was later introduced into the field of security controllers and smart cards. Nowadays, a large number of bypass attacks, from power analysis (SPA, DPA, PEA, template attack) and electromagnetic analysis (EMA, DEMA) to optical radiation analysis, have emerged and can be combined with other attack modes to achieve the best result.
The first way to deal with a bypass attack is to apply noise to the chip output signal, such as by using a noise generator. In addition, it counters against chip behavior, such as using dual-rail logic to minimize bypass signal generation. Today, the common method is to combine hard cryptographic coprocessors and certified cryptographic libraries. One of the newest ways is to use the internal encryption signal in the encryption coprocessor.
Today, the common method is to combine hard cryptographic coprocessors and certified cryptographic libraries. One of the newest ways is to use the internal encryption signal in the encryption coprocessor.
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