Been to the remaining capacity: pain but necessary

Since 2008, as part of the ten measures aimed at boosting domestic demand and driving economic growth, China embarked on a massive infrastructure expansion. This included large-scale projects such as roads, bridges, and airports. For many regions, this marked the "starting gun" for development, sparking rapid urbanization and industrialization. However, the long-term consequences of these investments have since become a topic of intense debate. Over the past five years, discussions about the effectiveness of the 2008 stimulus package have continued to grow. The reflection on the so-called "4 trillion yuan" economic stimulus program has not yet subsided. By 2012, a new wave of investment boom was emerging, raising concerns once again about overcapacity and unsustainable growth. Things began to shift in June 2013 when Premier Li Keqiang chaired a State Council meeting, emphasizing the need to address overcapacity. He called for targeted mergers and acquisitions (M&A) loans for companies integrating excess capacity and strictly prohibited new credit for illegal construction projects with serious overcapacity issues. This signaled a turning point in China’s approach to managing its economy. The term “4 Trillion 2.0” has been widely used to describe the renewed investment trend, though officials have denied it. Nevertheless, the pattern seems similar to the 2008 stimulus. Many of the approved projects still focus on traditional sectors like steel, infrastructure, and energy—areas that were heavily invested in during the previous round. For example, in May 2012, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) approved major projects such as the Zhanjiang Iron and Steel Base and the Guangxi Fangchenggang Steel Base, both with massive investment scales. These developments suggest that the government is still prioritizing heavy industries despite warnings about overcapacity. By 2012, the problem of overcapacity had become more pronounced. Key sectors like automobiles and real estate were experiencing downturns, and product prices were falling due to surplus supply. Corporate profits declined, and investment slowed down significantly. According to the IMF's 2012 Country Assessment Report, China’s capacity utilization rate dropped from around 80% before the 2008 crisis to just 60% in 2011, further declining to 54.7% by early 2013. This cycle of overinvestment and overcapacity has led to repeated calls for structural reforms. While the central government has repeatedly emphasized the elimination of outdated production capacity, actual progress has been slow. Local governments, driven by the pursuit of GDP growth, have often continued to push for new projects, contributing to redundant construction and inefficiency. In recent years, the language around capacity issues has evolved. From “resolutely eliminating backward production capacity” to “strictly controlling investment in overcapacity industries,” the focus has shifted toward sustainable development. Yet, the data tells a different story: capacity utilization rates have continued to decline, indicating that the problem remains unresolved. Addressing overcapacity is now a critical challenge for China’s economy. The recent policy adjustments, including M&A support and stricter lending rules, are steps in the right direction. However, without deeper structural reforms, the country may find itself caught in another cycle of overinvestment and economic imbalance.

SPR rubber Vertical Slurry Pump

Naipu SPR rubber Vertical Slurry Pumps are vertical, centrifugal slurry pumps submerged in sump to work.They are designed for delivering abrasive,large particle and high density slurries.These pumps have no need of any shaft seal and sealing water. They can also be operated normally for insufficient suction duties.Wet parts of type NP-SP pump are made of abrasion-resistant metal. All parts of type NP-SP(R) pump immersed in liquid are lined with rubber outer liner.They are suited to transport non-edge angle abrasive slurry.

Typical Applications---

Sump drainage washdown
Floor drainage
Mill sumps
Carbon transfer
Monitoring

Magnetite mixing

NP-SPR Construction Drawing

Showing Component

Main Part Number At The Drawing

1.Discharge Pipe
2.Column
3.Strainer
4.Back Liner
5.Impeller
6.Pump Casing
7.Lower Pipe


Materials of Construction

IMPELLERS

CASING

COLUMN

DISCHARGE

SEALS

Standard

High Chrome Alloy Rubber

High Chrome Alloy Rubber

Mild Steel
Mild Steel Rubber Lined

Mild Steel
Mild Steel Rubber Lined

Natural Rubber
Rubber

Options

Butyl
EPDM
Hypalon
Polyurethane
316 SS
W 151

Neoprene
Butyl
EPDM
Hypalon
Nitrile
316 SS
W 151

Neoprene
Butyl
Nitrile
316 SS

Neoprene
Butyl
Nitrile
316 SS

Nordel
Neoprene
Viton
Hypalon
Butyl
EPDM


Selection Chart

Selection Chart

SP SUMP PUMP PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS


Type

Allowable Mating Max. Power(Kw)

Range Of Performance

Impeller

Capacity/Q

Head/m

Speed/rpm

Max Efficiency/%

No. of Vanes

Impeller Diameter/mm

m³/hr

L/S

40PV-NP-SP

15

19.44-43.2

5.4-12

4.5-28.5

1000-2200

40

5

188

65QV-NP-SP

30

23.4-111

6.5-30.8

5-29.5

700-1500

50

5

280

100RV-NP-SP

75

54-289

15-80.3

5-35

500-1200

56

5

370

150SV-NP-SP

110

108-479.16

30-133.1

8.5-40

500-1000

52

5

450

200SV-NP-SP

110

189-891

152.5-247.5

6.5-37

400-850

64

5

520

250TV-NP-SP

200

261-1089

72.5-302.5

7.5-33.5

400-750

60

5

575

300TV-NP-SP

200

288-1267

80-352

6.5-33

350-700

50

5

610




Spr Rubber Vertical Slurry Pump,40Pv Rubber Slurry Pump,65Qv Rubber Vertial Pump,100Rv Rubber Slurry Pump

Shijiazhuang Naipu Pump Co., Ltd. , https://www.naipu-pump.com